Is the US ready for multiple wars?

Since the end of the Second World War the United States has assumed global responsibilities for deterring anti-Western powers and protecting its allies around the globe. This approach has required planning and resourcing to be able to fight in multiple simultaneous conflicts.

Yet from 2011 to the present the U.S. has reduced the size of its military forces and narrowed the scope of its defense industrial base, even as competitors such as China, Russia, and Iran have stepped up military spending, regional military operations, and direct challenges to the interests of the U.S. and the West. This has led to growing concern over the credibility of America's security guarantees, especially in the event of multiple coordinated threats.

How ready is the U.S. to meet simultaneous threats? The answer depends on three key variables. First, how realistic is it that the U.S. will face war on two or more fronts in the future? Second, what key gaps are driving concern over readiness? Third, what is a reasonable net assessment of capabilities against possible threats, and what can be done to improve overall readiness?

These questions have taken on increasing urgency in Washington due to wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. The answer is of great interest to American political elites, but equally so to allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere - including Türkiye.

- WILL THE US HAVE TO FIGHT ON MULTIPLE FRONTS?

Strategic analysts in the U.S. increasingly see simultaneous wars as a plausible scenario in the coming years. If Beijing decides to launch an invasion of Taiwan, it is plausible that a multiple front war in Asia - including combat on the Korean peninsula - could result.

Given increasingly close strategic and military cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran, the US could find itself fighting in three theaters at once. If we include the possibility of aiding allies like Israel and Ukraine combined with defense against direct attacks from rivals, some analysts predict a need to fight on five fronts. The prospects for multiple overlapping wars are more realistic than at any point since the end of the Cold War.

- GROUNDS FOR CONCERN

There are several resource and capability shortfalls of concern regarding the ability of the U.S., and its allies, to fight simultaneously in different locations. The first is basic force structure -the existence of a sufficient number of ground divisions, carrier battle groups, air wings, and forward basing to direct and execute combat around the globe.

A second is financial: for the first time this year, the U.S. government spent more servicing the national debt than on national defense, with the path of future spending indicating more constraints for military investment in future.

A third is industrial production capacity,a especially for munitions and high-tech weapons.

A fourth is sufficient supply of rare earth minerals and other strategic materials used in modern communication, navigation, and weapon systems, an area in which China has an overwhelming advantage and near-monopoly.

Finally, there is the matter of political will; after several decades of fighting wars of choice overseas (Iraq and Afghanistan especially), the willingness of US and Western publics to participate in conflicts abroad is wavering.

- CURRENT ASSESSMENT

The conservative Heritage Foundation provides a systematic annual appraisal of U.S. readiness to defend its global interests through its Index of Military Strength. Their framework includes key interests (homeland defense, ability to win a major war in critical regions, and preserving freedom of movement throughout the global commons), given a mix of rivals and allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

The Index rates U.S. aggregate military strength as "weak" when measured against potential threats and rivals, largely as a result of a decade of underfunding and lagging modernization. The result is "significant risk of not being able to defend America's vital national interests with assurance."

An important caveat here is that history is proven the U.S. can mobilize with determination and effectiveness for the right reasons. American ingenuity and latent military potential make it highly likely that the U.S. will prevail in any sustained conflict in which its people feel directly threatened or aggrieved.

Yet the point is clear for wars of choice or less vital interests - the U.S. may not be in a position to enforce its will during multiple peripheral crises. Allies consequently must be prepared to contribute more to their own defense, and should not assume that Washington will save them.

The erosion of American deterrent power vis a vis potential threats has not gone unnoticed among strategic analysts and policy-makers, and is certain to be part of election debates over the next two and a half months. U.S. forces remain the most potent in the world, but given the global scope of U.S. interests, it is a fair question whether Washington's lagging investments have eroded its credibility against the suite of potential threats.

Restoring that credibility doesn't mean just throwing more money at the Pentagon. It will require more astute alliance management and burden sharing, prudence in assessing regional conflict dynamics, and a better job of restoring fiscal sanity to the US budget.